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iiAbstract
In this paper, the authors examine the aggregate national balance-sheets of non-ﬁnancial
corporations in Australia and the G7 countries with a view to assessing both their ﬁnancial
structure and their ﬁnancial position. More importantly, the authors investigate whether the
ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial corporations (i.e., debt-to-equity ratio) is material to the
economy’s investment prospects and whether the importance of this channel differs depending on
the structure of corporate ﬁnancing i.e., bank-based or market-oriented ﬁnancing structures.
Based on a dynamic business investment error-correction model that controls for the opportunity
cost of capital and output growth, the authors test the above hypotheses using a quarterly panel
dataset of eight developed economies over the 1992-2005 period. Their empirical results suggest
that the ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial corporations has a statistically signiﬁcant impact on
aggregate business investment growth, although the effect is quantitatively modest. Thus, their
ﬁndings are consistent with the prediction of models that feature credit market imperfections such
as costly information and asymmetric information. Moreover, the effect of corporate ﬁnancial
position appears to be statistically equivalent regardless of whether a country’s corporations
predominantly ﬁnance their investments through bank borrowing or market-oriented ﬁnancing.
JEL classiﬁcation: E22, E32, E44
Bank classiﬁcation: Business ﬂuctuations and cycles; International topics
iiiRésumé
Les auteurs examinent les bilans nationaux globaux des sociétés non ﬁnancières de l’Australie et
des pays du Groupe des Sept en vue d’évaluer leur structure et leur situation ﬁnancières. Ils
cherchent en particulier à déterminer si la situation ﬁnancière de ces sociétés (c’est-à-dire leur
ratio emprunts / capitaux propres) inﬂue sur les perspectives de l’économie en matière
d’investissement et si l’importance de ce canal dépend de la structure du ﬁnancement des
entreprises (ﬁnancement obtenu auprès des banques ou sur le marché). Les auteurs testent ces
hypothèses à l’aide d’un modèle d’investissement dynamique à correction d’erreurs qui prend en
compte l’incidence du coût d’opportunité du capital et de la croissance de la production; ils ont
recours pour ce faire à un ensemble de données de panel trimestrielles concernant huit économies
développées et portant sur la période 1992-2005. Leurs résultats empiriques donnent à penser que
la situation ﬁnancière des sociétés non ﬁnancières a un effet statistiquement signiﬁcatif sur la
croissance globale de l’investissement des entreprises, encore que cet effet reste quantitativement
modeste. Les conclusions des auteurs cadrent par conséquent avec celles des modèles qui tiennent
compte de l’existence d’imperfections sur le marché du crédit (telles que la présence d’une
information coûteuse et asymétrique). De plus, l’incidence de la situation ﬁnancière des sociétés
semble équivalente sur le plan statistique, que les entreprises d’un pays ﬁnancent de façon
prédominante leurs investissements par voie d’emprunt bancaire ou sur le marché.
Classiﬁcation JEL: E22, E32, E44
Classiﬁcation de la Banque: Cycles et ﬂuctuations économiques; Questions internationales
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1. Introduction
Over the past decade, issues pertaining to the ﬁnancial structure and ﬁnancial position of
economic agents have received growing attention in the economic literature. Indeed, the ﬁnancial
structure and ﬁnancial position of economic agents are of particular interest for central banks
because they may have an impact on the way monetary policy is transmitted through the banking
system and ﬁnancial markets. Corporations have a signiﬁcant impact on the performance of the
economy, in part through their ability to invest and thereby generate income and employment.
Thus, it is important to consider whether or not the ﬁnancial position of corporate balance sheets,
at an aggregate level, can affect corporate investment decisions.
One theoretical benchmark, based on Modigliani and Miller (1958), assumes perfect capital
markets, and suggests that the ﬁnancial structure of corporations i.e. the way corporations ﬁnance
their assets, whether through debt or equity, is not material to investment prospects. Thus, given
perfect information, this framework also implies that the cost of external funds faced by
corporations is identical to that of internal ﬁnancing.
A number of inﬂuential theoretical papers have shown, however, how capital market
imperfections arising from imperfect information can cause net worth to affect corporate
investment decisions. Indeed, credit markets may be inefﬁcient due to costly information;
therefore, prices cannot perfectly reﬂect all available information (Grossman 1976, Grossman and
Stiglitz 1980). Similarly, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) suggest that credit is rationed at current asset
prices due to imperfect information about the quality of investment projects. More generally,
credit market imperfections associated with asymmetric information can lead to an external
ﬁnance premium, which depends inversely on borrowers’ creditworthiness (as measured by
borrowers’ ﬁnancial positions). This external ﬁnance premium might reﬂect the expected cost
faced by lenders in terms of screening, evaluating and monitoring the quality of investment
projects (Bernanke and Gertler 1989).
Empirical studies featuring credit market imperfections in the form of asymmetric information are
often disaggregated panel data studies. In examining ﬁnancial constraints on investment, this
literature has focused on ﬁrm-level data, given that cost and quantity constraints are likely related
to ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics (see the evidence presented in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
1988, Gertler and Gilchrist 1994, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1996, Von Kalckreuth 2001,
and La Cava 2005). At the same time, some evidence of ﬁnancial constraints on investment is
found at the aggregate level, in the form of a ﬁnancial accelerator (see Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (BGG) 1999). Nevertheless, current macroeconomic forecasting models do not2
generally deﬁne an explicit role for ﬁnancial constraints on investment. In other words, such
aggregate investment equations do not allow for a direct impact on investment from the
borrower’s ﬁnancial position, although an indirect effect may exist through the cost of capital. As
such, to the extent that the ﬁnancial position of borrowers worsens (improves), forecasting
investment with these macroeconomic models will inevitably overestimate (underestimate)
aggregate investment.
Within the context of the existing literature, one objective of this paper is to examine aggregate
national balance-sheets of non-ﬁnancial corporations in Australia and the G7 countries with a
view to assessing both their ﬁnancial structure and their ﬁnancial position. More importantly, the
paper investigates whether the ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial corporations (i.e., debt-to-equity
ratio) is material to the economy’s investment prospects and whether the importance of this
channel differs depending on the structure of corporate ﬁnancing i.e., bank-based or market-
oriented ﬁnancing structures. Note, however, that this paper does not attempt to estimate the
structural parameters associated with the ﬁnancial accelerator or any other type of ﬁnancial
friction. Instead, the paper takes a more general approach, asking whether or not the ﬁnancial
position of corporate balance sheets is important in explaining investment growth within a
reduced-form framework. To our knowledge, no studies have yet been published that examine the
connection between the ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial corporations and business investment
at the aggregate level using a panel dataset of industrialized countries.
Our methodology is as follows. We begin with a quarterly panel dataset containing national
balance sheet data for eight developed economies (i.e., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) over the 1992 to 2005 period. Given the
complexity of national balance sheet accounts and the differences in such accounts across
countries, we chose to focus on data for the total non-ﬁnancial sector of each country, which
includes both private and government-sponsored enterprises to ensure comparability across
countries (see Appendix A for details).1 Although a longer time sample would be preferable, a
lack of available national data did not permit this. At the same time, beginning our sample in the
early 1990s limits the extent to which structural changes may affect our econometric results.
Using this dataset, we ﬁrst construct several ratios so as to assess corporate ﬁnancial structure and
ﬁnancial position. More speciﬁcally, light is shed on ﬁnancial structure using indicators such as
loans, issued debt and equity, each as a share of corporate liabilities. These ratios allow us to
determine whether a country’s corporate sector ﬁnances its assets mainly through banks or via the
1. For all countries in our panel dataset, the private non-ﬁnancial corporate sector represents about 90 per cent of
total non-ﬁnancial corporations. Note also that our balance sheet data are expressed on a market-value basis.3
market. Attention is then turned toward an assessment of corporate ﬁnancial position based on the
debt-to-equity ratio which, as a measure of leverage, is the most relevant balance sheet indicator
when considering investment decisions. At the same time, the debt-to-equity ratio also
summarizes the structure of corporate ﬁnancing.
On the whole, our ﬁnancial structure indicators reveal that non-ﬁnancial corporations in Australia,
Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States tend to ﬁnance their assets through
the market i.e., debt and equity issuances, while non-ﬁnancial corporations in Germany, Japan,
and Italy tend to ﬁnance their assets through bank loans. With regard to corporate ﬁnancial
position, the debt-to-equity ratio has exhibited a downward trend in recent years in most
economies with a brief increase early in the present decade following the decline in technology
share prices.
Moving on to address the main question of the paper, panel cointegration and error-correction
techniques are applied to our dataset in an effort to analyze the short-term determinants of
business investment. Based on a dynamic business investment error-correction model that controls
for the opportunity cost of capital and output growth, we test whether ﬁnancial positions of non-
ﬁnancial corporations matter for aggregate investment growth using the debt-to-equity ratio as a
measure of corporate ﬁnancial position.
To summarize our main empirical results, having corrected for potential endogeneity bias using
the Arellano and Bond (1991) generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology, we ﬁnd
evidence that the ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial corporations does indeed have a statistically
signiﬁcant impact on aggregate business investment growth, although the effect is quantitatively
modest. Moreover, the importance of corporate ﬁnancial position appears to be statistically
equivalent regardless of whether a country’s corporations predominantly ﬁnance their investments
through bank borrowing or bond/equity ﬁnancing. At the same time, changes in overall real
economic activity and the real cost of capital are found to affect investment growth, although the
latter is not statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. On the whole, these results, which are
contrary to the prediction of Modigliani and Miller’s theoretical model, are thus consistent with
the prediction of models that feature credit market imperfections such as costly information and
asymmetric information.
Taken as a whole, our empirical results suggest that, large movements in the rate of change of the
debt-to-equity ratio may pose a risk to the outlook for investment growth, in light of the fact that
most macroeconomic models used to formulate monetary policy do not allow corporate ﬁnancial
position to impact investment directly.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy surveys the related literature.
Section 3 examines both the ﬁnancial structure and ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial
corporations. Section 4 provides some empirical evidence on whether the ﬁnancial position of
non-ﬁnancial corporations affects investment beyond the usual neoclassical and Keynesian
channels, and whether the importance of this channel differs between bank-based and market-
oriented ﬁnancial structures. Section 5 concludes and suggests paths for future research.
2. Literature Relevant to Our Research
The interaction between the ﬁnancial position of economic agents and the transmission of
monetary policy has been of interest to economists and policymakers for decades. Indeed, by the
ﬁrst half of the 1900s, the investment literature was already addressing the interaction between
real and ﬁnancial variables (i.e., balance sheet variables). For example, Irving Fisher (1933), in
examining how the role of deﬂating prices may have augmented the decline in aggregate demand
during the great depression, noted the important role played by the level of private debt.
In contrast to Fisher’s view, Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrated that, under certain strict
conditions, the structure of corporate ﬁnancing was irrelevant to the cost of capital, and implicitly
to the assessment of risk by lenders. This result implies that the cost of external funds is identical
to that of internal ﬁnancing (i.e., they are perfect substitutes). However, these conclusions depend
on the assumption of perfect capital markets, symmetry of information and complete contracts
between borrowers and lenders.
Despite Modigliani and Miller’s theorem, other authors remained concerned with the interaction
between real and balance sheet variables. Until the late 1970s, however, a theoretical basis for
using variables representing constraints on ﬁnancing was largely absent and, in light of the
Modigliani and Miller’s theorem, macroeconomic modelling had largely abstracted from the
inﬂuence of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions on the evolution of the real economy. At the same time,
empirical studies in the 1970s and 1980s that attempted to ﬁnd a relationship between the cost of
capital and investment spending were largely unsuccessful.2 The literature then focused on
explaining this result.
Beginning in the mid-eighties, theoretical developments suggested that the Modigliani-Miller
theorem may not hold under imperfect information. A number of inﬂuential papers followed,
showing how capital market imperfections can arise under asymmetric information. Building on
2. Blanchard (1986) suggests that this result may be due to a positive correlation between the real user cost of
capital and a productivity variable that is omitted from the neoclassical investment framework.5
the conceptual work of papers such as Akerlof (1970), Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the seminal papers of Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995)
assumed imperfect capital markets and asymmetry of information, linking the cost of a ﬁrm’s
external ﬁnancing to the quality of their balance sheet in a simple real business cycle model. The
authors concluded that the magnitude and persistence of business-cycle ﬂuctuations can be
ampliﬁed by informational asymmetries in credit markets that introduce a wedge between the cost
of external and internal funds, i.e., the external ﬁnance premium. This channel has come to be
known as the balance-sheet channel of monetary policy.3
Drawing from their earlier work, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (BGG, 1999) develop a
ﬁnancial-accelerator model which speciﬁes an explicit formal link between the borrowing costs of
ﬁrms and their net worth. The authors ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial accelerator is quantitatively important
in their calibrated sticky-price dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model of the United States.
Similarly, Hall (2001a) and Fukunaga (2002) ﬁnd that the BGG model can help explain weak
investment periods in the United Kingdom and Japan. In particular, Hall (2001b) shows that
ﬁnancial accelerator effects appeared more important in the early 1990s recession than in the
1980s recession as U.K. corporations were much more dependent on external ﬁnancing in the
early 1990s. Following on the work of BGG, Christensen and Dib (2006) estimate a sticky-price
dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with a ﬁnancial accelerator. They ﬁnd some
quantitative evidence in favour of the ﬁnancial-accelerator model which helps explain investment
ﬂuctuations in the United States.
Other studies that are more empirical in nature have examined the interaction between balance
sheet and real variables. For instance, Vermeulen (2002) using ﬁrm-level data for Germany,
France, Italy and Spain ﬁnds ample evidence of a ﬁnancial accelerator with different strength
across ﬁrm size classes and asymmetric effects over the business cycle. Kennedy and Sløk (2005)
examine how corporate sector vulnerability may affect output growth in the G7 countries. Two
measures of vulnerability are developed using ﬁrm-level data. The ﬁrst measure is the share of
employment represented by ﬁrms with both high debt-to-equity ratios (equal to or greater than
100 per cent) and a low ability to service that debt as measured by the current ratio (equal to or
less than 1.5). The second measure is the share of market capitalisation represented by ﬁrms with
high debt-to-equity ratios. Using a panel regression model that controls for lagged real GDP
growth and the yield curve, the authors ﬁnd that both measures of vulnerability are statistically
3. Although the balance-sheet literature focused on corporations, this channel has been applied to consumer
spending as well. For example, Mishkin (1977) explores the role of consumers’ balance sheet position in
consumption equations and ﬁnds that it was an important factor in explaining the severity of 1973–1975
recession in the United States. Similarly, Mishkin (1978) and Bernanke (1983) argued that the weakness of
borrowers’ balance sheets in 1929–1933 contributed signiﬁcantly to the severity of the Great Depression in the
United States.6
signiﬁcant in explaining GDP growth one year ahead for the G7 economies over the 1990–2003
period.4 Furthermore, similar results were found using business investment as opposed to GDP,
suggesting that business investment may be the relevant transmission channel. Relatedly, Jaeger
(2003) estimates a reduced-form time-series investment equation for the Euro Zone, ﬁnding that
higher leverage (i.e., debt-to-equity ratio or debt-to-internal-funds ratio) has statistically and
economically signiﬁcant negative effects on corporate investment, particularly during periods of
above-average leverage.
Davis and Stone (2004) examine the link between corporate ﬁnancial structure and contractions in
investment and inventories. After accounting for fundamental factors, the authors ﬁnd a marked
correlation between the debt-to-equity ratio and investment/inventory declines following crises.
Thus, the study suggests that changes in corporate ﬁnancial ﬂows following crises impinge
signiﬁcantly on bank lending, and, thus, investment and GDP, and are of greater magnitude for
emerging market countries and after banking crises. The effect is found to be less important for
OECD countries or following currency crises. As a result, the authors suggest that industrialized
countries beneﬁt from the existence of multiple channels of intermediation. For example, bond
issuance is shown to pick up in the wake of banking crises. In the end, Davis and Stone advise
authorities to give corporate sector balance sheet indicators priority when monitoring ﬁnancial
stability.
Although the credit channel literature generally refers to the external ﬁnance premium within the
context of bank-based ﬁnancing, ﬁrms may also face an external ﬁnance premium when issuing
bonds. As such, monetary authorities should monitor developments in the corporate bond market,
in addition to the loan market. Using aggregate data, De Bondt (2004) investigates the balance
sheet channel of monetary policy working through the euro area corporate bond market and ﬁnds
that variations in the price and availability of corporate bonds may act as an important monetary
transmission channel.5
Taken as a whole, the economic literature appears to ﬁnd that corporate balance sheet indicators
play a signiﬁcant role in determining the growth of business investment. As such, this paper
investigates such a relationship for Australia and the G7 countries in Section 4. In preparation for
this, however, Section 3 begins by brieﬂy discussing ﬁrms’ requirement for ﬁnancial capital,
including the choice between different types of external ﬁnancing. Non-ﬁnancial corporate sector
4. In addition to the measures of vulnerability, lagged of GDP growth and the yield curve were also found to be
statistically signiﬁcant in explaining output growth, while the ﬂow-of-funds measure of the debt-to-equity ratio
was not.
5. Note that, in De Bondt’s study, the external ﬁnance premium on corporate bonds is proxied by the spread
between long-term BBB-rated euro area corporate bond yields and government bond yields.7
national balance sheet accounts are then used to built several ﬁnancial ratios in order to assess
corporate ﬁnancial structure and ﬁnancial position in developed economies.
3. Financial Analysis of Non-Financial Corporate Balance Sheets
Firms require ﬁnancial capital to ﬁnance their operations. In addition to using internally generated
funds such as retained earnings, ﬁrms can also ﬁnance their operations with external funds such as
bank loans, and issued debt or equity. A corporation’s need to use external funds is primarily
inﬂuenced by its ﬁnancing gap, i.e., the difference between capital expenditures and internally
generated funds. Although the reasons behind a ﬁrm’s choice between different forms of capital
are complex, mainstream theories suggest that a ﬁrm’s capital structure is based on minimizing its
cost of capital. Nevertheless, several factors can inﬂuence this decision including inﬂation, taxes,
interest rates, and expectations about the future evolution of these variables.
In the following subsections, we use the national balance sheet accounts for the non-ﬁnancial
corporate sector in order to build several ﬁnancial ratios which will assist us in assessing
corporate ﬁnancial structure and ﬁnancial position (See Table 1 for a summary of these ratios). In
our assessment of ﬁnancial structure, we calculate bank loans, issued debt, and equity, each as a
share of total liabilities. These ratios allow us to determine whether a country’s non-ﬁnancial
corporate sector ﬁnances its assets mainly through banks (or other ﬁnancial institutions) or
through the market. Finally, in our assessment of corporate ﬁnancial positions, we focus on the
debt-to-equity ratio as it is the most relevant indicator from a lender’s point of view when
evaluating ﬁrms’ ability to repay their debt.
3.1 National Balance Sheet Account Data
Focusing on the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector, we use national balance sheet accounts to build
several key ﬁnancial ratios that are useful in assessing a corporation’s ﬁnancial structure and
ﬁnancial position. Although it is ideal to create these statistics only for the private non-ﬁnancial
corporate sector, private and public corporations are only shown separately in the national balance
sheet accounts for Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the
case of France, Germany, and Italy, private and public non-ﬁnancial corporations are grouped
together and are unavailable separately in the national balance sheet accounts. Therefore, to
ensure comparability across countries in our panel dataset, we use data for the total non-ﬁnancial
corporate sector. Including government-sponsored non-ﬁnancial corporations is unlikely to alter
the data to a great extent, however, given that roughly 90 per cent of the non-ﬁnancial corporate
sector in Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States is made up of8
private non-ﬁnancial corporations. Balance sheet data for most countries are available on a
quarterly basis, reaching back to the early 1990s, although longer time horizons are available for
some countries. Note that the national balance sheet account data used in this paper are
constructed on a market-value basis (See Appendices A and B for details).
3.2 Structure of Corporate Financing
The ﬁnancial structure of non-ﬁnancial corporations in Australia and the G7 countries is
illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b. Of note, equity ﬁnancing is currently the most important source
of external funds for Australia and the G7 countries. It is also worth mentioning that for most
countries, however, we cannot distinguish between outstanding shares and retained earnings as
they are grouped together under the heading of “shares and other equity.” That said, in 2005,
Australia, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States had the largest proportion
of ﬁnancing in the form of equity while Japan, Germany, and Italy had the smallest. Total loans,
on the other hand, are the second most important source of external ﬁnancing for France,
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia, while issued debt and “other
liabilities” take that rank for Canada and the United States. On the whole, our ﬁnancial structure
indicators reveal that non-ﬁnancial corporations in Australia, Canada, France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States tend to ﬁnance their assets through the market i.e., debt and
equity issuances, while non-ﬁnancial corporations in Germany, Italy, and Japan tend to ﬁnance
their assets through bank loans.6
3.3 A Key Indicator of Corporate Financial Position
In our assessment of corporate ﬁnancial position, we focus on the debt-to-equity ratio as it is the
most relevant indicator, from a lender’s point of view, when evaluating the ability of ﬁrms to repay
debt incurred to ﬁnance investment projects. It is also the best proxy of a ﬁrm’s net worth.7 In
addition to being an indicator of ﬁnancial position, the debt-to-equity ratio also summarizes the
structure of corporate ﬁnancing by calculating the relationship between loans and issued debt in
comparison to equity. As such it is the debt-to-equity ratio that we make use of in our empirical
investigation in Section 4.
A high debt-to-equity ratio generally denotes a relatively highly leveraged non-ﬁnancial corporate
sector (i.e. corporations ﬁnance more of their investment through bond issuances or loans than
6. While France has traditionally been described as a “bank-based” economy in the existing literature, we classify
France as a market-based economy based on recent national balance sheet statistics.
7. Other ﬁnancial position indicators which focus more on short-term balance sheet considerations such as the
currentratioandtheratioofshort-termliabilitiestototalliabilitiesarediscussedinAppendixCandillustratedin
Figures 3 and 4 of Appendix E.9
they do through issuing shares or retained earnings). Moreover, a comparatively high ratio
generally suggests increased ﬁnancial fragility as corporations are more likely to default on their
debt obligations, ceterus paribus. In addition, a high debt-to-equity ratio may also suggest that
corporations are experiencing difﬁculty in obtaining capital through equity markets, perhaps
because the market holds a negative outlook in regard to the corporation’s management or
business/industry outlook. Within this context, differences in determining factors such as agent
preferences, regulation (including the tax framework), and ﬁnancial market development, may
lead corporations in some countries to maintain a higher sectoral debt-to-equity ratio, ceterus
paribus, than corporations in other countries. In such cases, higher leverage may be sustainable
over time.
To the extent that debt-to-equity ratios have trended downward in recent decades, the overall
ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial corporations has improved. After generally reaching a low in
1999, leverage in most countries has increased somewhat during the present business cycle
following the decline in technology share prices. Nevertheless, leverage remains low by historical
standards. Referring to Figure 2, lower corporate leverage in the mid-2000s compared with the
early 1990s indicates that non-ﬁnancial corporations are currently in better ﬁnancial position to
deal with interest rate changes, pursue new investment opportunities and confront unanticipated
economic and ﬁnancial shocks. Non-ﬁnancial corporations in Japan, Germany, and Italy continue,
on average, to maintain a higher debt-to-equity ratio in comparison to the non-ﬁnancial corporate
sectors in the other countries. Japan, however, is a special case. Following a signiﬁcant decline
throughout the 1980s, the leverage of Japanese non-ﬁnancial corporations remained unusually
high for a sustained period of time throughout most of the 1990s following the end of Japan’s
asset price bubble (1990–92). In more recent years, however, the debt-to-equity ratio of the
Japanese non-ﬁnancial corporate sector has improved substantially, having nearly returned to the
low level seen in early 1989, close to levels presently observed in Germany and Italy. As such,
concern over the ﬁnancial vulnerability of Japanese corporations has eased considerably.
4. Does Financial Position of Non-Financial Corporations Matter
for Aggregate Investment Growth?
This section of the paper examines whether the ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial corporations is
material to the economy’s investment prospects. In particular, it examines whether the
composition of corporate balance sheets (i.e., debt-to-equity ratio) affects investment beyond the
usual neoclassical and Keynesian channels. Given the signiﬁcant deepening that has taken place
in many corporate bond and equity markets in recent years, it is also important to assess whether10
the effect of corporate balance sheets on investment differs between countries with ﬁnancial
systems that are more bank-based as opposed to market-based. These questions are investigated
by applying an error-correction framework to a panel dataset of developed countries (namely,
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
Underlying this error-correction model is a long-run investment equation. This investment
equation is based on the neo-classical model ﬁrst proposed by Jorgensen (1963) and later
expanded in Jorgensen (1967, 1971), in which the simple Keynesian accelerator model is
augmented to include the effects of relative price variables, speciﬁcally a proxy for the real user
cost of capital. The model is derived by solving for the desired long-run stock of capital in a ﬁrm
proﬁt-maximization problem subject to a production technology assumption and a capital
accumulation identity.
Abstracting from the implications of taxation and uncertainty, the proﬁt of a ﬁrm can be deﬁned
as follows:
(1)
where Rt is proﬁt, Pt is the product price, Yt is real output, Wt is the wage, Lt is hours worked, qt is
the price of investment goods, and GIt is real gross investment.8,9
(2)
Given the nominal discount rate, it, the objective of the ﬁrm is to choose the desired capital stock
and labour, Kt and Lt, so as to maximize Vt, the present value of the future path of proﬁts (or
earnings) subject to a production function and a capital accumulation condition. The production
function can be characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production technology (equation 3), where At is





9. qt represents the shadow price of capital, or Tobin’s q, and is equal to the price of investment goods under the
assumption of no adjustment costs.
Rt PtYt WtLt – qtGIt – =
Vt
Rti +
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Assuming that the capital stock depreciates at the rate d, the capital accumulation condition is as
deﬁned by equation 4:
(4)
Assuming no adjustment costs, the ﬁrm’s intertemporal choice can be approximated by a two-
period optimization problem. Substituting equations (1), (3) and (4) into equation (2), and taking
the derivative with respect to Kt, yields the following ﬁrst-order condition for the desired capital
stock:
(5)
where Ct denotes the real user cost of capital:
(6)
Assuming a constant growth rate of the capital stock in steady state and given the capital
accumulation identity (equation 4), real gross investment can be represented as a constant ratio of
the capital stock. Thus, the desired long-run capital stock can be reorganized into a long-run log-
linear relationship between real gross investment, real output, and the real user cost of capital as
shown in equation 7:
It = a1yt + a2ct + ut, (7)
In essence, this speciﬁcation captures supply and demand factors that deﬁne the level of real gross
investment in the long run.
To address the main question of the paper, Jorgensen’s model can be slightly modiﬁed to account
for ﬁnancial imperfections in capital markets which can cause ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial positions (i.e., net
worth) to affect investment decisions. This is done under the assumption that ﬁrms, when
maximizing the present value of the future path of proﬁts, do not internalize the effect that the
debt-to-equity ratio may have on the interest rate. Thus, the real user cost of capital, denoted C*
t,
can be augmented by an external ﬁnance premium which depends on ﬁrms’ net worth as proxied
by the debt-to-equity ratio, Dt/Et:
(8)
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where y is a positive function of the debt-to-equity ratio, and y' > 0. In line with standard models,
we expect a3 to equal zero in the long run. This may not be the case, however, when one considers
the short run.
Along these lines, our analysis uses a modiﬁed version of Jorgensen’s investment model, as
shown in equation 9, which accounts for the effect of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial positions on investment
decisions:
It = a1yt + a2ct + a3(dt/et)+ ut, (9)
where,
It = natural logarithm of real gross business investment at time t,
yt = natural logarithm of real GDP at time t,
ct = natural logarithm of the real user cost of capital at time t, deﬁned as: log(1 + rrlt*(pibust/
pgdpt)), where rrlt = the real 10-year bond yield, pibust = the business investment price
deﬂator, pgdpt = the gross domestic product price deﬂator,
dt/et = natural logarithm of the debt-to-equity ratio at time t.
Equation 9 can be interpreted as a long-run investment equation under the cointegration
hypothesis, i.e., if the “residual” ut is I(0). Therefore, one must ﬁnd evidence that the variables of
interest are I(1) and, moreover, that a unique cointegrating relationship exists between them.
Evidence of the former is provided by way of a variety of unit-root tests displayed in Table 2. The
Hadri panel unit-root test, the Levin-Lin-Chu test, and the Im-Pesaran-Shin test suggest, overall,
that the log-levels of variables included in equation 9 are non-stationary (i.e., I(1)), although
evidence is somewhat mixed in the case of the real user cost of capital.
We test for cointegration using the Johansen panel cointegration trace and maximum eigenvalue
tests, as well as Pedroni panel and group cointegration tests. Using the general-to-speciﬁc
approach, we begin with all four variables included in equation 9, i.e., real gross investment, real
output, the real cost of capital, and the debt-to-equity ratio. Referring to the lower portion of
column (1) in Table 3, the Johansen tests and some Pedroni tests (without a trend) give limited
evidence of cointegration between these four variables. As shown in the lower portion of column
(2) in Table 3, if one removes the debt-to-equity ratio from equation 9 and considers real gross
investment, real output, and the real cost of capital, no evidence of cointegration is found between
the three variables using the Johansen tests, although the Pedroni panel and group cointegration
tests (with a trend) do provide some evidence of cointegration. On the other hand, if one considers13
only real gross investment and real output (see column (3) in Table 3), strong evidence of
cointegration is obtained using both the Johansen tests and Pedroni tests. Thus, overall, this latter
combination (i.e., real investment and real output) provides solid evidence of cointegration,
although mixed evidence is also found for all the other aforementioned combinations of variables.
Therefore, one can interpret equation 9, as an investment equation and draw valid inferences from
its estimated parameters.
Empirical estimation of equation 9 uses a quarterly panel dataset covering Australia and the G7
countries over the period 1992Q1 to 2005Q4. Estimated long-run parameters are obtained using
the panel Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) leads-and-lags procedure which corrects for
potential endogeneity bias (Kao and Chiang 2000, Mark and Sul 2002). More speciﬁcally, these
estimates are derived with four leads and four lags on the ﬁrst difference of the long-run
determinants.10
Column (1) of Table 3 presents the panel estimation results with all four variables included in
equation 9, i.e., real gross investment, real output, the real cost of capital, and the debt-to-equity
ratio. As can be seen from the table, the estimated parameter associated with real output is
statistically signiﬁcant while those associated with the real cost of capital and the debt-to-equity
ratio are not statistically signiﬁcant. Although not reported in Table 3, the estimated parameter
associated with the debt-to-equity ratio remains not statistically signiﬁcant when one considers
real output but excludes the real cost of capital.
Column (2) of Table 3 presents the panel estimation results for a traditional Jorgensen-type
speciﬁcation of our long-run total business investment equation, including real output and the real
cost of capital as explanatory variables. In line with the Keynesian accelerator model, the
estimated parameter associated real output is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. However,
consistent with previous studies (see Section 2 above), the estimated parameter associated with
the real cost of capital is not statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, we drop the real cost of capital from
the long-run investment equation, recalling also that strong evidence of cointegration was found
when one considered only real business investment and real output (i.e., the real cost of capital
and the debt-to-equity ratio are absent from the long-run investment equation 9 such that a2 =0
and a3 = 0). Therefore, column (3) of Table 3 presents our preferred speciﬁcation of the long-run
real investment equation which includes only one explanatory variable: real output.
10. Note that we include country dummies in our long-run equations to account for country-speciﬁc effects such as
currency units. Traditional ﬁxed-effects panel estimation is not used so as to avoid the demeaning inherent in
such “within” estimators. Note also that our long-run conclusions hold if the lag-structure in equation 9 is
reduced from four to two. All panel estimations and statistical tests were performed using the Stata and Eviews
software packages.14
Thus, taking our long-run investment equation as a cointegrating vector, we then use the two-step
Engle-Granger procedure to estimate an investment error-correction model of the following form:
A(L)DIt = B(L)DIt-1 + C(L)Dyt + D(L)Dct + E(L)D(dt/et) + g[It-1 - aSt-1] + et (10)
where, aSt = a1yt + a2ct + a3(dt/et) (10.1)
with A(L), B(L), C(L), D(L), and E(L) being polynomials in the lag operator. The residual from
our long-run estimation (equation 9 with a2=0 and a3=0) is taken as an error-correction term
within equation 10. More speciﬁcally, the long-run parameters of our preferred speciﬁcation, as
shown in column (3) of Table 3, appear as vector a in equation 10. Furthermore, the short-run
dynamics are modelled by a fourth-order lag process of the ﬁrst difference of the log of real
business investment, real output, the real cost of capital and the debt-to-equity ratio.
In this error-correction framework, actual business investment moves toward its long-run level
with a speed of adjustment, g.F o rg < 0, the error-correction term ensures that It converges
towards St in the long run and provides further evidence of cointegration.11 A rejection of the non-
cointegration hypothesis, g = 0, against the (stationarity) alternative hypothesis, g <0 ,is evidence
that It and St are cointegrated. This suggests that one can test for cointegration in the context of
equation 10 by making inferences on the basis of the t-statistic corresponding with ^ g, which we
will refer to as ^ tg.12
Based on our preferred long-run relationship between real business investment and real output,
column (1) of Table 4 gives the key estimated parameters of equation 10 using the standard panel
ordinary least squares estimator. Noting that we ﬁnd further evidence of cointegration given the
statistical signiﬁcance of the error-correction term, we focus primarily on the dynamic portion of
equation 10. In general, the estimated parameters suggest that the growth of investment is affected
positively by an increase in output growth and negatively by a deterioration in the ﬁnancial
position of non-ﬁnancial corporate balance sheets (i.e., a rise in the debt-to-equity ratio), but is
unaffected by the cost of capital.13 Note, however, that the effect of a change in the growth rate of
the debt-to-equity ratio on the change of the growth of investment is modest, such that an increase
11. The Granger Representation Theorem states that, if two variables (or a variable versus a vector of variables) are
cointegrated, then there exists an error-correction model that can capture the dynamics underlying the
cointegrating relationship between the variables (see Engle and Granger 1987).
12. In the estimation procedure,g is constrained to be equal across countries.
13. As mentioned previously, it has not been uncommon in the investment literature to ﬁnd statistically insigniﬁcant
estimates on the user cost of capital. Blanchard (1986) suggests this is likely due to misspeciﬁcation error
inherent in the neoclassical investment model whereby the user cost of capital may be positively correlated with
an omitted productivity variable.15
of one percentage point in the growth of the debt-to-equity ratio implies a decline of 0.03 of a
percentage point on the growth of business investment.14
Given the above evidence that changes in the ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial corporations
affect investment growth, it is of interest to explore whether this effect differs between countries
whose corporations are typically ﬁnanced through bank lending as opposed to market funding. If
investment is more sensitive to corporate leverage under one type of ﬁnancial structure than
another, this holds important implications for the transmission of monetary policy in a given
economy. Thus, we split our debt-to-equity ratio variable in equation 10 into two separate
variables, one for countries with corporations with predominantly bank-based ﬁnancing and the
other for countries with corporations with predominantly market-based ﬁnancing.15 The debt-to-
equity ratio is found to have a statistically signiﬁcant effect in both bank-based countries and
market-based countries (see column (2) of Table 4). Moreover, the sum of statistically signiﬁcant
lags on the debt-to-equity ratio is over twice as large in the case of the bank-based economies.
However, the results of a Wald restriction test suggest that one cannot statistically differentiate
between the overall estimated effect of the debt-to-equity ratio in bank-based or market-based
economies.
Although the panel OLS results presented thus far appear reasonable, it is possible that the
estimated parameters may suffer from endogeneity bias. Thus, it is prudent to verify our results
using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, which attempts to correct for
possible endogeneity bias through the use of instrumental variables. More speciﬁcally, the
Arellano and Bond ﬁrst-difference GMM estimator, as put forth in Arellano and Bond (1991), can
be used in cases where country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects may also be present in the data.16 Indeed,
based on a “redundant ﬁxed effects” likelihood ratio test, we ﬁnd evidence of country-speciﬁc
ﬁxed effects in our data, thus suggesting it is proper to remove these ﬁxed effects using the
Arellano and Bond GMM estimator.
Of course, the speciﬁcation of instruments in a GMM setting depends on one’s use of
instrumental variables. Column (3) in Table 4 applies the Arellano and Bond GMM methodology
14. Actual data may be used to quantify this effect over history. For example, based on Canadian data, the average
annualized quarterly growth rate of investment over our sample was about 5 per cent. Based on our estimated
parameter, the growth rate of the debt-to-equity ratio, which has been negative on average, contributed to
increase the growth rate of investment by 0.05 of a percentage point. Thus, the effect has been limited.
15. Based on the stylized facts reported previously regarding the structure of corporate ﬁnancing, corporations in
Germany, Italy and Japan rely relatively more on bank-based ﬁnancing, while the ﬁnancing of corporations in
Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States is relatively more market-based.
16. The Arellano and Bond GMM estimator is a particular type of GMM estimator that uses lagged differences of
the dependent variable with contemporaneous and lagged differences of explanatory variables as instruments to
remove potential endogeneity bias.The Arellano and Bond GMM estimatoralso removes country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effects by ﬁrst-differencing the equation of interest.16
to our standard speciﬁcation of the error-correction model using lags of the dependent variable as
predetermined instruments while including all other explanatory variables as strictly exogenous
instruments.17 In broad terms, the conclusions drawn above in the case of panel OLS remain
robust under panel GMM estimation in that changes in output and the debt-to-equity ratio remain
statistically signiﬁcant in explaining in investment growth. Interestingly, when statistically
signiﬁcant lags are summed, the estimated impact on investment growth of a change in the debt-
to-equity ratio is found to be more than twice as large under GMM, about -0.069, compared to
about -0.027 when estimated using panel OLS. Moreover, changes in the cost of capital are also
found to have a negative effect on investment growth. Note also that the statistical signiﬁcance of
the error-correction term gives further evidence of a cointegrating relationship taking the form of
equation 9.
Although these initial GMM results are generally encouraging, it is likely more realistic to include
changes in output, the cost of capital and the debt-to-equity ratio as predetermined rather than
exogenous instruments. Thus, column (4) in Table 4 presents Arellano and Bond panel estimation
results in which all explanatory variables, excluding the error-correction term, are used as
predetermined instrumental variables. Again, our general ﬁndings remain robust with changes in
output, the cost of capital and the debt-to-equity ratio explaining, in part, changes in investment
while we continue to ﬁnd evidence of cointegration. However, in this case, the combined
magnitude of statistically signiﬁcant lags of the change in the debt-to-equity ratio returns to a
level very similar to what was found in column (1) of Table 3 using the panel OLS estimator (i.e.,
-0.03). These ﬁndings are robust to various combinations of other predetermined instrumental
variables.
Column (5) of Table 4 reports our GMM results when we consider if the impact of the balance
sheet on investment growth differs between countries whose corporations depend relatively more
on bank ﬁnancing as opposed to market ﬁnancing.18 We ﬁnd that our initial conclusions based on
the panel OLS estimator are robust. Indeed, although the estimated effect of corporate balance
sheet position on investment growth is larger in the case of bank-based economies, a Wald
restriction test cannot reject the null hypothesis that this effect is statistically the same in both
bank-based and market-based economies.
To summarize our empirical results, we ﬁnd evidence that the ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial
corporations does indeed have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on aggregate business investment
growth, although the effect is quantitatively modest. Moreover, the importance of corporate
17. Please see footnotes to Table 4 for a description of the speciﬁc instruments used in our GMM estimation.
18. Note that, in all instances, our GMM results are found to satisfy the Arellano and Bond assumption that no
second-order autocorrelation is present in the model (See Table 4).17
ﬁnancial position appears to be statistically equivalent regardless of whether a country’s
corporations predominantly ﬁnance their investments through bank borrowing or bond/equity
ﬁnancing. At the same time, changes in overall real economic activity and the real cost of capital
are found to statistically affect investment growth, although the latter is not statistically signiﬁcant
in all speciﬁcations.
Finally, our empirical results, as presented above, are qualitatively robust with respect to
alternative measures of expected inﬂation (i.e., backward-looking versus more forward-looking
measures calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter on the year-over-year inﬂation rate),
alternative measures of long-term bond yield (i.e., government bond yields versus corporate bond
yields), as well as alternative dynamic error-correction speciﬁcations (i.e., a lag length of four
versus two).19
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the aggregate national balance-sheets of non-ﬁnancial
corporations in Australia and the G7 countries over the 1992 to 2005 period, with a view to
assessing both their ﬁnancial structure and their ﬁnancial position. More importantly, the paper
has investigated whether the ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial corporations (i.e., the debt-to-
equity ratio) is material to the economy’s investment prospects. The paper also examined whether
the importance of this channel differs depending on the structure of corporate ﬁnancing i.e., bank-
based or market-oriented ﬁnancing structures. Our ﬁnancial structure indicators reveal that non-
ﬁnancial corporations in Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States
tend to ﬁnance their assets through the market i.e., debt and equity issuances while non-ﬁnancial
corporations in Germany, Japan, and Italy tend to ﬁnance their assets through bank loans.
To summarize, the main conclusion that we draw from our empirical analysis is that the ﬁnancial
position of non-ﬁnancial corporations has a statistically signiﬁcant impact on aggregate business
investment growth, although the effect is quantitatively modest. At the same time, changes in
overall real economic activity and the real user cost of capital are found to affect aggregate
investment growth, however, the latter is not statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
Moreover, the importance of corporate ﬁnancial position appears to be statistically equivalent
regardless of whether a country’s corporations predominantly ﬁnance their investments through
bank borrowing or bond/equity ﬁnancing. These results are thus consistent with the prediction of
19. These alternative empirical results are available upon request.18
models that feature credit market imperfections such as costly information and asymmetric
information.
We reach these conclusions using panel cointegration and error-correction techniques to analyze
the short-term determinants of business investment. Our results are supported by formal panel
cointegration tests. Potential endogeneity bias is also addressed using the Arellano and Bond
(1991) generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology within the error-correction
framework. Our empirical results are qualitatively robust with respect to alternative measures of
the real user cost of capital (i.e., backward-looking versus more forward-looking measures of
expected inﬂation, and long-term government bond yield versus long-term corporate bond yield),
as well as alternative dynamic error-correction speciﬁcations (i.e., a lag length of four versus two).
In the ﬁnal analysis, given that most macroeconomic models used to formulate monetary policy
do not allow borrowers’ ﬁnancial positions to directly affect investment, the results of this paper
suggest that large movements in the rate of change of the debt-to-equity ratio may pose a risk to
the outlook for investment growth.
Although it would have been preferable to base these conclusions on a larger sample of data, a
lack of available national time-series observations did not permit this. Thus, given our limited
panel dataset, we assumed homogeneous dynamics across countries. Going forward, when
additional data become available, our analysis could be extended to allow for cross-sectional
heterogeneity whereby the response of investment growth to aggregate corporate ﬁnancial
position differs across countries. Additionally, depending on balance sheet data availability, our
methodology could be extended to allow comparison between developed and developing
economies. For instance, one could investigate whether the effect of balance sheet position on
investment growth is more binding for corporations in developing countries.19
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Appendix A: National Balance Sheet Accounts
With the advent of the European System of Accounts (ESA 95) in 1995, differences between
countries with respect to national balance sheets have become less important. This implies that
cross-country comparisons are likely to be more accurate over the recent years. In this section, we
highlight the key components of the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector of the national balance sheet
accounts of Australia and the G7 countries.20
In Australia, aggregate balance sheet items for “non-ﬁnancial corporations” are drawn from the
Australian System of National Accounts. Non-ﬁnancial corporations are mostly privately-owned,
but there are some public corporations for which data are published separately. Private non-
ﬁnancial corporations represent about 90 per cent of the all non-ﬁnancial corporations, and are
deﬁned as those private corporations which exist to produce goods and non-ﬁnancial services.
Public non-ﬁnancial corporations, on the other hand, cover the national, state and local level of
public non-ﬁnancial corporations.
Aggregate balance sheet items for “non-ﬁnancial corporations” in Canada are published in the
National Balance Sheet Accounts. The non-ﬁnancial corporate sector includes both the non-
ﬁnancial private corporate sector and government business enterprises. The former represents
about 90 per cent of the total non-ﬁnancial corporate sector. The non-ﬁnancial private corporate
sector is comprised of the domestic transactions of private, industrial, Canadian resident
corporations. This sector excludes unincorporated businesses which are instead included in the
“Persons and unincorporated business” sector. It also includes branches and subsidiaries of
foreign corporations operating in Canada. Values for assets, liabilities and equity are measured on
an accounting or book value basis. Since June 2004, values for assets, liabilities and equity are
also available on a market value basis going back to 1990.
Aggregate balance sheet items for “non-ﬁnancial corporations” in France are published by the
Banque de France. The sector comprises private corporations and public corporations. Aggregate
balance sheet items for “non-ﬁnancial corporations” in Germany are released as part of the
“Financial Accounts for Germany” and include both non-ﬁnancial private corporations and
government business enterprises. With the advent of the ESA 95 accounting standard, the non-
ﬁnancial corporate sector now comprises genuine corporations and so-called quasi-corporations
(principally partnerships such as general partnerships and limited partnerships). Sole proprietors
and self-employed persons, whose entrepreneurial activities are indistinguishable from the
20. National balance sheet accounts of France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States are produced by their
respective central banks. In Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, they are produced by their respective
national statistical agency.24
transactions of private individuals are classiﬁed as belonging to the “Household” sector.
Aggregate balance sheet items for “non-ﬁnancial corporations” in Italy are produced by the Banca
D’Italia. The sector includes both private and public corporations, as well as cooperatives.
Aggregate balance sheet items for “non-ﬁnancial corporations” in Japan are released within the
“Bank of Japan Quarterly Bulletin”. Non-ﬁnancial corporations are primarily privately-owned,
but there are some public corporations which are shown separately. Private non-ﬁnancial
corporations represent about 90 per cent of aggregate “non-ﬁnancial corporations.” Private
nonﬁnancial corporations are deﬁned as nonﬁnancial corporations that are owned and controlled
by entities other than government. This includes proﬁt-making corporations such as joint-stock
corporations, limited companies, limited partnerships, unlimited partnerships and medical
corporations.
In the United Kingdom, aggregate balance sheet items for “non-ﬁnancial corporations” are part of
the United Kingdom Economic Accounts. Non-ﬁnancial corporations are mostly privately-owned,
but there are some public corporations which are shown separately. Private non-ﬁnancial
corporations represent about 90 per cent of total non-ﬁnancial corporations. Private non-ﬁnancial
corporations are those which exist to produce goods and non-ﬁnancial services. Total non-
ﬁnancial corporations also include public limited companies, in addition to private companies and
partnerships.
In the United States, aggregate balance sheet items for “Nonfarm non-ﬁnancial Corporate
Business” are drawn from the Flow of Funds Accounts. The nonfarm non-ﬁnancial corporate
business sector includes all private domestic corporations with the exception of corporate farms
and ﬁnancial institutions. The nonfarm non-ﬁnancial corporate business sector includes holding
companies, S-corporations, and real estate management corporations.21 Like Canada, this sector
excludes unincorporated businesses. However, unlike Canada, the transactions of “unincorporated
businesses” are not included in the “Households or Personal” sector but are instead part of the
“Nonﬁnancial Nonfarm Noncorporate Business and Farm Business” sector. The nonfarm non-
ﬁnancial corporate business sector covers only domestic activities; as such it does not include
ﬁnancial transactions of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. The operations of foreign
corporations within the United States are, however, included in the nonfarm non-ﬁnancial
corporate business sector.22
21. S-corporations are corporations having thirty-ﬁve or fewer stockholders that elect to be taxed as if they were





Appendix B: A Description of National Balance Sheet Data
Australia
Source: Produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics
Publication: Financial Accounts, Australian National Accounts, No. 5232.0. Tables: 2, 3, and 4.
Financial Assets and Liabilities of Private non-ﬁnancial corporations, National public non-
ﬁnancial corporations and State and local public non-ﬁnancial corporations.
Website: http://www.abs.gov.au
Data: Quarterly series from 1988 online. Billions of dollars.
Financial Assets
Short-term assets: Currency and deposits, Holdings of bills of exchange accepted by Banks,
One name paper issued, Prepayment of premiums and reserves, Other
accounts receivable
Long-term assets: Bonds, Derivatives, Loans and placements, Equities issued by: Other deposi-
tory corporations, Financial intermediaries, and Rest of world
Financial Liabilities
Total loans: Loans and placements
Trade credit: Other accounts payable
Short-term liabilities:Drawings of bills of exchange, One name paper issued in Australia, One
name paper issued offshore, Other accounts payable
Long-term liabilities:Bonds etc. issued in Australia, Bonds etc. issued offshore, Derivatives,
Loans and placements
Issued debt: Drawings of bills of exchange, One name paper issued in Australia, One
name paper issued offshore, Bonds etc. issued in Australia, Bonds etc. issued
offshore, Derivatives
Equity: Listed shares and other equity, Unlisted shares and other equity
Financial Position Indicators
Current ratio: Short-term assets/Short-term liabilities
Debt-to-equity ratio:(Total loans + Issued debt)/Equity26
Canada
Source: Produced by Statistics Canada
Publication: National Balance Sheet Accounts, Catalogue no. 13-214-XIE.
Reference: A Guide to the Financial Flow and National Balance Sheet Accounts
Website: http://www.statcan.ca
Data: Quarterly series from 1990 online. Millions of dollars.
Financial Assets
Short-term assets: Currency and bank deposits, Other deposits, Foreign currency deposits, Con-
sumer credit, Trade receivables, Other loans, Canada short-term paper, Other
short-term paper, Other ﬁnancial assets
Long-term assets: Mortgages, Canada bonds, Provincial bonds, Municipal bonds, Other bonds,
Corporate claims, Government claims, Shares, Foreign investments
Financial Liabilities
Total loans: Bank loans, Other loans, Mortgages
Trade credit: Trade payables
Short-term liabilities:Trade payables, Bank loans, Other loans, Other short-term paper, Other lia-
bilities
Long-term liabilities:Mortgages, Provincial bonds, Municipal bonds, Other bonds, Corporate
claims, Government claims
Issued debt: Other short-term paper, Provincial bonds, Municipal bonds, Other bonds
Equity: Shares
Financial Position Indicators
Current ratio: Short-term assets/Short-term liabilities
Debt-to-equity ratio:(Total loans + Issued debt)/Equity27
France
Source: Produced by Banque de France
Publication: Provisional Annual Financial Accounts
Reference: see publication above.
Website: http://www.banque-france.fr
Data: Annual series from 1977 online. Millions of euros.
Financial Assets
Short-term assets: Currency and deposits, Short-term loans, Other accounts receivable, Interest
accrued but not yet due on negociable debt securities, Insurance technical
reserves
Long-term assets: Securities other than shares, Long-term loans, Shares and other equity
Securities other than shares: Negotiable short and medium term securities (TCN) and similar
paper, Bonds and similar paper, Financial derivatives
Financial Liabilities
Total loans: Short-term loans, Long-term loans
Short-term liabilities:Short-term loans, Other accounts payable, Interest accrued but not yet due
on loan, Interest accrued but not yet due on negociable debt securities
Long-term liabilities:Securities other than shares, Long-term loans
Issued debt: Securities other than shares: Negociable short and medium term securities
and similar paper, Bonds and similar paper, Financial derivatives
Equity: Shares and other equity
Financial Position Indicators
Current ratio: Short-term assets/Short-term liabilities
Debt-to-equity ratio:(Total loans + Issued debt)/Equity28
Germany
Source: Produced by Deutsche Bundesbank
Publication: Financial Accounts for Germany, 1991 to 2005, July 2006, Special Statistical
Publication 4.
Reference: see publication above.
Website: http://www.bundesbank.de
Data: Annual series from 1980 to 1990 are from publications. Annual series from 1991 online.
Billions of euros.
Financial Assets
Short-term assets: Currency and deposits, Money market paper, Short-term loans, Short-term
claims on insurance corporations, Other claims
Long-term assets: Bonds, Financial derivatives, Shares, Other equity, Mutual funds shares,
Longer-term loans, Longer-term claims on insurance corporations
Financial Liabilities
Total loans: Short-term loans, Longer-term loans
Trade credit: Not disclosed
Short-term liabilities:Money market paper, Short-term loans, Claims from company pension com-
mitments, Other liabilities
Long-term liabilities:Bonds, Financial derivatives, Longer-term loans
Issued debt: Money market paper, Bonds, Financial derivatives
Equity: Shares, Other equity, Mutual funds shares
Financial Position Indicators
Current ratio: Short-term assets/Short-term liabilities
Debt-to-equity ratio:(Total loans + Issued debt)/Equity29
Italy
Source: Produced by the Banca D’Italia
Publication: Supplements to the Statistical Bulletin, Monetary and Financial Indicators: Financial
Accounts, Volume XVI Number 36 – 23 June 2006.
Reference: The Italian ﬁnancial accounts
Website: http://www.bancaditalia.it
Data: Annual series from 1991 online. Millions of euros.
Financial Assets
Short-term assets: Currency and transferable deposits, Other deposits, Short-term securities,
Short-term loans (other residents), Other accounts receivable, Insurance tech-
nical reserves
Long-term assets: Bonds, Derivatives, Shares and other equity, Mutual fund shares
Financial Liabilities
Total loans: Short-term loans of Monetary ﬁnancial institutions (MFIs), Other short-term
loans, Medium and long-term loans of Monetary ﬁnancial institutions
(MFIs), Other Medium and long-term loans
Trade credit: Other accounts payable
Short-term liabilities:Short-term loans of MFIs, Other short-term loans, Short-term securities,
Other accounts payable, Insurance technical reserves
Long-term liabilities:Bonds, Derivatives, Medium and long-term loans of Monetary ﬁnancial
institutions (MFIs), Other Medium and long-term loans
Issued debt: Short-term securities, Bonds, Derivatives
Equity: Shares and other equity
Financial Position Indicators
Current ratio: Short-term assets/Short-term liabilities
Debt-to-equity ratio:(Total loans + Issued debt)/Equity30
Japan
Source: Produced by the Bank of Japan
Publication: Guide to Japan’s Flow of Funds Accounts
Website: http://www.boj.or.jp
Data: Quarterly series from 1965 online. Hundred millions of yens.
Financial Assets
Short-term assets: Currency and deposits, Deposits with the Trust Fund Bureau, Loans, Com-
mercial paper, Deposit money, Accounts receivable, Trade credits and for-
eign trade credits
Long-term assets: Financing bills, Central, Local and Public government securities, Bank
debentures, Industrial securities, Investment trust beneﬁciary certiﬁcates,
Trust beneﬁciary rights, Structured-ﬁnancing instruments, Shares and other
equities, Financial derivatives, External claims (Outward direct investment,
Outward investment in securities, and Other external claims and debts)
Financial Liabilities
Total loans: Loans by private ﬁnancial institutions, Loans by public ﬁnancial institutions
Short-term liabilities:Loans, Commercial paper, Deposit money, Accounts payable, Trade credits
and foreign trade credits
Long-term liabilities:Industrial securities, Financial derivatives, External claims (Outward direct
investment, Outward investment in securities, and Other external claims and
debts)
Issued debt: Industrial securities, Commercial paper, Financial derivatives
Equity: Shares and other equities
Financial Position Indicators
Current ratio: Short-term assets/Short-term liabilities
Debt-to-equity ratio:(Total loans + Issued debt)/Equity31
United Kingdom
Source: Produced by the Ofﬁce of National Statistics
Publication: United Kingdom Economic Accounts, Quarter 4 2005
Website: http://www.statistics.gov.uk
Data: Quarterly series from 1987 online. Billions of pounds.
Financial Assets
Short-term assets: Currency and deposits, Short-term money market instruments’ issued, Other
accounts receivable, Prepayments of insurance premiums etc.
Long-term assets: Bonds issued, Long-term loans, Shares and other equity (incl. UK mutual
funds shares)
Financial Liabilities
Short-term loans: Sterling loans by UK monetary ﬁnancial institutions (UK MFI’s), Foreign
currency loans by UK MFI’s, Sterling loans by building societies, By rest of
the world MFIs
Long-term loans: Direct investment loans (outward and inward), Finance leasing, by UK resi-
dents, Other by the rest of the world
Total loans: Short-term loans, Long-term loans
Short-term liabilities:Short-term loans, Money market instruments issued by other UK residents,
Other accounts payable
Long-term liabilities:Long-term loans, Bonds issued by other UK residents
Issued debt: Money market instruments issued by other UK residents, Bonds issued by
other UK residents
Equity: Shares and other equity
Financial Position Indicators
Current ratio: Short-term assets/Short-term liabilities
Debt-to-equity ratio:(Total loans + Issued debt)/Equity32
United States
Source: Produced by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Publication: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Volumes 1 and 2.
Reference: Guide to the Flow of Funds Accounts
Website: http://www.federalreserve.gov
Data: Quarterly series from 1952 online. Billions of dollars.
Financial Assets
Short-term assets: Foreign deposits, checkable deposits and currency, Time and savings depos-
its, Money market fund shares, Security RPs, Commercial paper, Consumer
credit, Trade receivables, Miscellaneous assets
Long-term assets: Treasury securities, Agency- and GSE-backed securities, Municipal securi-
ties, Mortgages, Mutual fund shares
Financial Liabilities
Total loans: Bank loans n.e.c., Other loans and advances, Mortgages
Trade credit: Trade payables
Short-term liabilities:Commercial paper, Bank loans n.e.c., Other loans and advances, Trade pay-
ables, Taxes payable, Miscellaneous liabilities
Long-term liabilities:Municipal securities, Corporate bonds, Mortgages
Issued debt: Commercial paper, Municipal securities, Corporate bonds
Equity: Equities outstanding
Financial Position Indicators
Current ratio: Short-term assets/Short-term liabilities
Debt-to-equity ratio:(Total loans + Issued debt)/Equity33
Appendix C: Other Financial Position Indicators
The current ratio, a measure of liquidity, is deﬁned as the ratio of short-term assets to short-term
liabilities. The higher the current ratio, the more liquid, on average, are corporations. Generally,
corporations in good ﬁnancial standing will attempt to match the duration and composition of
assets to liabilities so as to minimize the possibility of illiquidity. Indeed, a high current ratio
generally implies that corporations are less likely to default on their obligations to suppliers and
short-term lenders. The liquidity of non-ﬁnancial corporations, as measured by the current ratio,
has improved since the early 1990s. Figure 3 suggests that ﬁve of the eight countries examined
feature a non-ﬁnancial corporate sector in which short-term assets more than cover short-term
liabilities. These countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the U.S. Corporations in
the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy report a moderate current ratio, with current assets covering
70 to 90 per cent of current liabilities. Generally, if corporations have easier access to short-term
credit, a lower current ratio may be sustainable. In this case, corporations would, on average, need
to hold less liquid assets at any given time since they could more easily raise additional funds at
short notice. In terms of trends, the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector of most countries have seen a
gradual upward trend in their current ratio over the past ten to twenty years, a sign of improving
liquidity. This trend could, in part, be explained by the growing role of service industries in the
world economy. Service industries, unlike the manufacturing sector, are often more reliant on
short-term investment as opposed to large long-term investments. Thus, a healthy, growing service
sector could imply an upward trend in the corporate sector current ratio.
The ratio of short-term liabilities to total liabilities (plus equity) provides information as to the
timing of future cash out-ﬂows. A high ratio, which implies that corporations’ liabilities are short-
term in nature, may be indicative of a coming cash shortage. As illustrated in Figure 4, short-term
liabilities of non-ﬁnancial corporations in most countries presently make up a about 20 to 30 per
cent of their total liabilities, suggesting that corporations, in general, are well positioned to avoid
short-term cash shortages. Corporations in the United States represent the top of this range, with a
ratio of about 30 per cent. Non-ﬁnancial corporations in Australia and Japan are outliers, with
short-term liabilities making up about 10 per cent of total liabilities in the former country and
about 45 per cent in the latter country. In general, all countries, especially Japan, have experienced
a trend decline in the ratio of short-term liabilities to total liabilities over the past ten to twenty
years. Thus, it appears that, in this respect, the ﬁnancial position of non-ﬁnancial corporations in
Australia and the G7 countries has improved in recent decades, despite deteriorating somewhat
during the early 2000s.34
Appendix D: Data Description
This appendix describes the data mnemonics used in this paper. Data are taken from Statistics
Canada, OECD (2006), BIS, and IMF databases.23 All time-series mnemonics consist of an
“economic variable” component, as shown in the table below. Each mnemonic also contains a
second component that denotes the country.
23. Any Canadian statistics taken from OECD (June 2006) were originally collected by Statistics Canada and
supplied to the OECD.
Mnemonic Description
Economic and Financial Variable Component
ibus<country> Real business gross ﬁxed investment.
ecpi<country> Expected inﬂation calculated as an 8-quarter moving average of the annual percentage
change in the national quarterly consumer price index with geometrically declining
weights.
ecpihp<country> Expected inﬂation generated using the low-frequency component of the annual per-
centage change in the national quarterly consumer price index; a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁl-
ter with a lambda value of 1600 is used in the ﬁltering process. CPI inﬂation forecasts
for 2007 and 2008 are from Consensus Forecasts, survey date 9 October 2006.
d/e<country> Debt-to-equity ratio as deﬁned in Appendix B.
pibus<country> Business investment price deﬂator.
pgdp<country> Gross domestic product price deﬂator.
pc<country> Consumer price index.
rl<country> 10-year nominal government bond yield.
rrl<country> Real 10-year government bond yield (deﬂated using ecpi).
rrlhp<country> Real 10-year government bond yield (deﬂated using ecpihp).
rlc<country> 10-year nominal corporate bond yield (middle rate) from Datastream.
rrlc<country> Real 10-year corporate bond yield (deﬂated using ecpi).
rrlchp<country> Real 10-year corporate bond yield (deﬂated using ecpihp).




Australia (aut), Canada (ca), France (fr), Germany (gy), Italy (it), Japan (jpn), the
United Kingdom (uk), and United States of America (us).35
Appendix E
Table 1. Non-Financial Corporation Balance Sheet Indicators
Structure of Corporate Financing and Financial Position Indicators, Per Cent, 1980-2005
Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S.
Total 1980 - - 91.0 60.2 - 167.7 - 68.9
Corporate 1990 85.1 105.7 105.7 63.3 77.1 208.2 88.8 80.9
Liabilities (less 1999 72.4 110.5 112.5 73.3 82.8 187.4 91.1 88.3
equity) 2000 78.3 108.3 120.7 84.2 85.0 180.3 99.6 96.6
to nominal GDP 2005 77.3 99.4 128.6 84.8 94.2 156.4 115.1 79.5
Total Loans 1980 - - 37.5 51.9 - 42.7 - 14.0
to Total 1990 33.9 20.1 29.0 45.6 41.1 37.1 32.2 16.8
Corporate 1999 22.3 13.9 16.7 31.2 29.3 35.5 19.5 7.4
Liabilities 2000 23.8 14.1 17.9 34.9 29.6 37.1 21.1 8.4
2005 23.6 10.2 19.8 34.7 31.9 29.0 29.5 9.9
Issued 1980 - - 3.1 2.6 - 7.4 - 13.1
Debt to 1990 13.9 17.3 5.0 2.7 2.0 7.7 5.0 16.1
Total Corporate 1999 10.1 14.9 4.6 1.3 1.0 8.9 6.7 10.4
Liabilities 2000 12.1 15.4 5.0 1.5 1.1 9.2 7.9 11.9
2005 11.9 12.5 5.8 2.9 2.5 8.3 10.1 15.6
Equity 1980 - - 29.9 19.2 - 21.6 - 40.1
to Total 1990 44.6 35.6 45.2 26.5 36.0 36.2 51.8 38.5
Corporate 1999 61.6 46.6 67.6 56.8 52.9 38.1 68.9 64.3
Liabilities 2000 57.7 44.0 65.3 51.8 54.4 33.6 66.1 56.9
2005 57.9 55.0 62.4 47.4 49.8 43.7 55.8 51.9
Trade Credit 1980 - - 31.9 - - 22.7 - 10.6
to Total 1990 5.9 8.9 19.9 - - 14.3 11.0 8.1
Corporate 1999 6.0 7.7 11.1 - 13.2 13.2 4.9 5.2
Liabilities 2000 6.4 8.4 11.8 - 11.5 15.2 4.8 6.9
2005 6.7 6.8 11.9 - 12.0 13.6 4.6 7.7
Other Liabilities 1980 - - 0.0 26.3 - 5.6 - 22.2
to Total 1990 1.8 18.0 0.0 25.2 - 4.7 0.0 20.4
Corporate 1999 0.0 16.9 0.0 10.7 3.5 4.3 0.0 12.7
Liabilities 2000 0.0 18.1 0.0 11.9 3.4 4.8 0.0 15.8
2005 0.0 15.6 0.0 15.0 3.9 5.5 0.0 14.9
Current 1980 - - 0.8 0.5 - 0.7 - 0.9
Ratio 1990 1.4 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.0
(not in per cent) 1999 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.3
2000 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.4
2005 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.7
Short-Term 1980 - - 43.2 44.7 - 70.4 - 43.8
Liabilities 1990 16.3 32.2 27.9 40.2 50.2 56.2 32.2 43.4
to Total 1999 12.1 25.2 15.5 20.9 34.0 52.5 17.2 24.8
Liabilities 2000 13.5 26.6 17.1 23.8 32.6 56.2 18.0 30.8
2005 11.7 20.3 18.2 24.6 31.0 46.0 23.1 29.8
Debt-to- 1980 - - 136.1 283.0 - 232.2 - 67.5
Equity 1990 107.1 105.2 75.2 182.4 119.7 123.9 71.8 85.7
Ratio 1999 52.6 61.8 31.5 57.3 57.3 116.5 37.9 27.6
2000 62.2 67.1 35.1 70.3 56.3 137.8 43.9 35.8
2005 61.3 41.3 41.1 79.3 69.1 85.3 70.8 49.036
Table 2: Unit-Root Testsa
Panel Dataset of Australia and the G7 Countries, Sample: 1992:01–2005:04, N=448





















[0.000] [0.000] [0.427] [0.118] [0.984] [0.171]
Real Output
(yt)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.083] [0.510] [0.999] [0.804]
Real Cost of Capital
(10-year government bond yield
deﬂated using ecpi (backward look-
ing inﬂation expectations))
(costt)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.975] [0.563] [0.877] [0.001]
Real Cost of Capital
(10-year government bond yield
deﬂated using ecpihp (HP-ﬁltered
inﬂation expectations))
(costhpt)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.804] [0.730] [0.906] [0.010]
Real Cost of Capital
(10-year corporate bond yield
deﬂated using ecpi (backward look-
ing inﬂation expectations))
(costct)
[0.000] [0.025] [0.997] [0.062] [0.954] [0.000]
Real Cost of Capital
(10-year corporate bond yield
deﬂated using ecpihp (HP-ﬁltered
inﬂation expectations))
(costchpt)
[0.000] [0.019] [0.432] [0.069] [0.731] [0.000]
Debt-to-Equity Ratio
(debtratiot)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.177] [0.121] [0.769] [0.507]
a. Under the Hadri panel unit-root test, the null hypothesis states that the series is stationary. Under the Levin-Lin-Chu test
and the Im-Peseran-Shin test, the series is non-stationary under the null hypothesis.37
Table 3: Panel DOLS Estimations of Long-Run Investment Equation
and Cointegration Test Resultsa
a. Four leads and four lags are used in panel DOLS estimation. The estimated parameters of the ﬁrst-difference terms are
constrained to be the same across countries (i.e., homogeneous dynamics). White heteroskedasticity-consistent errors are
used in the calculation of the t-statistics (in parentheses). *(**)(***) denotes that the parameter is statistically different from
zero at a 10 per cent (5 per cent) (1 per cent) level. Critical values are from the standard distribution. See Kao and Chiang
(2000) for a discussion of the properties of panel DOLS.
Panel Estimations, Australia and the G7 Countries, Sample: 1992:01–2004:04, N=416












Real Cost of Capital
(10-year government bond
yield deﬂated using ecpi)b
(costt)











(Numbers in brackets refer to
columns in Table 3)
(1) aut: -8.70, ca: -8.99, fr: -9.28, gy: -9.32, it: -8.98, jpn: -11.81, uk: -9.25, us: -10.28
(2) aut: -10.81, ca: -11.16, fr: -11.49, gy: -11.62, it: -11.17, jpn: -15.02, uk: -11.38, us: -12.76
(3) aut: -10.86, ca: -11.22, fr: -11.55, gy: -11.69, it: -11.23, jpn: -15.13, uk: -11.44, us: -12.83
RBAR2 0.999 0.999 0.999
Cointegration Tests (p-value), Sample: 1992:01–2005:04, N=448c
c. Null hypothesis for Johansen tests is “at most zero/one cointegrating vector.” Null hypothesis for Pedroni tests is “no
cointegration.”
Johansen Trace Test
[0 or 1 cointegrating vectors]
[0.000/0.805] [0.084 / 0.606] [0.288 / 0.082]
Johansen Eigenvalue Test
[0 or 1 cointegrating vectors]
[0.000/0.621] [0.052 / 0.605] [0.503 / 0.082]
Pedroni Tests No Trend With Trend No Trend With Trend No Trend With Trend
Panel v Test [0.672] [0.164] [0.716] [0.801] [0.439] [0.834]
Panel rho Test [0.134] [0.312] [0.133] [0.054] [0.350] [0.044]
Panel pp Test [0.115] [0.505] [0.088] [0.057] [0.284] [0.039]
Panel adf Test [0.072] [0.524] [0.259] [0.024] [0.650] [0.078]
Group rho Test [0.021] [0.061] [0.008] [0.007] [0.047] [0.007]
Group pp Test [0.018] [0.219] [0.003] [0.011] [0.033] [0.006]
Group adf Test [0.033] [0.318] [0.083] [0.007] [0.256] [0.022]38
Table 4: Investment Error-Correction Modela,b
a. White heteroskedasticity-consistent errors are used in the calculation of the t-statistics (in parentheses). *(**) denotes that the
parameter is statistically different from zero at a 10 per cent (5 per cent) level.
b. Estimation performed using EViews 5.1 with the exception of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation which was performed
using STATA. Estimation results are the same using either package. Estimated parameters for lagged values of the dependent
variable were included in the speciﬁcation but are not shown in the table.
Panel ECM Estimations, Australia and the G7 Countries, Sample: 1992:01–2005:04, N=448
Dependent Variable: Dln(I)t
Panel OLS Arellano & Bond GMMc
c. Estimations completed using the Arellano and Bond ﬁrst-difference robust GMM estimator. Estimates in column (3) use up to ﬁve
lags of the dependent variable as predetermined instruments, while treating the other explanatory variables as exogenous
instruments. In column (4) up to three lags of the dependent variable, as well as output growth (one lag), the change in the log of
the cost of capital (one lag), and the change in the log of the debt-to-equity ratio (up to two lags) are used as predetermined
instruments. In column (5), up to three lags of the dependent variable, as well as output growth (one lag), the change in the log of
the cost of capital (one lag), and the change in the log of the debt-to-equity ratio (one lag) are used as predetermined instruments.
In all cases, four lags of the error-correction term are also included as exogenous instruments. (Results were found to be generally
robust to various combinations of predetermined and strictly exogenous instrumental variables.)
(natural logarithms) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.006 (-4.369)** -0.006 (-4.264)** - - -
Real Output
(dyt)


























Real Cost of Capital
(10-year government bond
yield deﬂated using ecpi)
(dcostt)

















































































-0.112 (-6.495)** -0.1122 (-6.473)** -0.329 (-8.691)** -0.160 (-6.494)** -0.189 (-8.441)**
RBAR2 0.348 0.352 0.415 0.299 0.315
AR(1)d
d. Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation (H0: No autocorrelation). The Arellano and Bond estimator assumes no second-order
autocorrelation.
- - 0.023 0.017 0.019
AR(2)d - - 0.584 0.843 0.62239
Figure 1a
Structure of Corporate Financing
Percentage of Total Liabilities (1988Q1-2005Q4)
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Figure 1b
Structure of Corporate Financing
Percentage of Total Liabilities (1988Q1-2005Q4)
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Short-Term Liabilities as a Share of Total Liabilities
(1988Q1 - 2005Q4)
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